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Abstract The debate on the relationship between institutions and economic development is
discussed, focusing on two illustrations, i.e., the impact of democracy and political instabil-
ity on economic growth. Various pitfalls of existing research are identified, like sensitivity of
the outcomes to model specification, sample heterogeneity, measurement of political vari-
ables, and the treatment of the time dimension.
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1 Introduction
I will present my views on how to investigate the impact of political institutions on economic
growth. North (1981) defines institutions as “a set of rules, compliance procedures, and
moral and ethical behavioral norms designed to constrain the behavior of individuals in the
interests of maximizing the wealth or utility of principals” (pp. 201–202). The key word
here is constraints. As pointed out by Glaeser et al. (2004), there is another essential aspect
of institutions: the constraints need to be reasonably permanent or durable.
I admit that this topic is not at all new.1 In fact, it has been on the research agenda for
quite a while. However, I am not very satisfied with the results so far, mainly because I feel
that the methodology underlying most of the research may not be adequate to tackle this
issue. I will use two examples: the impact of the political system on economic growth and
1For surveys see Cox and McCubbins (2001), Holcombe (2001), Kurrild-Klitgaard and Berggren (2004) and
Gwartney et al. (2005).
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the impact of political instability on economic growth.2 I will also provide some ‘footnotes’
on what I consider to be perverse research incentives in our profession.
2 Democracy and economic growth
Over time, views on the relationship between democracy and economic development have
changed. In the 1960s and 1970s democracy and economic growth were often considered
as competing concerns. As Bhagwati (1966, pp. 203–204) put it: “the political economy of
development poses a cruel choice between rapid (self-sustained) expansion and democratic
process”. More recently, authors often came to more optimistic conclusions. Rodrik (2000,
p. 22) states, for instance, that “Recent empirical studies based on samples of more than
100 countries suggest that there is little reason to believe democracy is conducive to lower
growth over long time spans.” Indeed, Sala-i-Martin (1997) and Sturm and De Haan (2005)
reach the conclusion that respect for political rights and civil liberties is robustly related to
economic growth.3 Probably the best known paper in this field is Barro (1996). I will use
this study to illustrate what goes wrong in this line of research.4
Barro has estimated a growth model applying a panel of roughly 100 countries observed
from 1960 to 1990. The dependent variables are the growth rates of real per capita GDP over
three periods: 1965–75, 1975–85, and 1985–90. The regressions include various control
variables including measures of human capital in the form of schooling and health, the
initial level of GDP, the fertility rate, government spending for consumption and education,
the black-market premium on foreign exchange, an index of the maintenance of the rule
of law, the ratio of gross investment to GDP, and the change in the terms of trade. If the
democracy indicator, i.e., the so-called Gastil index, is entered in a quadratic form in this
model the estimated coefficient of the linear term is positive whereas that of the squared
term is negative. So these results suggest that, at low levels of democracy, more political
freedom enhances growth. The growth rate reaches a peak at a middle level of democracy
and then diminishes if democracy continues to rise.5
What is wrong with this model? I see at least four fundamental problems:
1. arbitrary model
2. possible sample heterogeneity
3. measurement of democracy
2The empirical evidence that I will show—by way of illustration—draws heavily on my collaboration with
Jan-Egbert Sturm and Richard Jong-A-Pin.
3Doucouliagos and Ulubasoglu (2006) apply meta-regression analysis to 470 estimates derived from 81 pa-
pers on the democracy-growth association. They find that, once all the available evidence is considered,
democracy has no direct effect on economic growth. On the other hand, it has robust and significant indirect
effects on growth.
4This is not to say that Barro (1996) is representative of all studies in this line of research. See, for instance,
Plümper and Martin (2003) for a much better attempt to model the relationship between democracy and
growth.
5Barro (1996) also finds that democracy is positively related to income per capita, confirming the view gener-
ally associated with Lipset (1959), who argued that “only in a wealthy society in which relatively few citizens
lived in real poverty could a situation exist in which the mass of the population could intelligently participate
in politics and could develop the self-restraint necessary to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible
demagogues” (p. 75). Recently, this view has been challenged by Acemoglu et al. (2005) who argue that
including country fixed effects or employing instrumental-variables estimates removes the statistical associa-
tion between income per capita and various measures of democracy.
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4. treatment of time dimension
These problems are quite general: many empirical studies on the relationship between polit-
ical institutions and growth suffer from one or more of these problems. First, from a theoret-
ical perspective, the model as used by Barro (1996) is highly suspect: there is no theory that
yields this particular specification.6 Second, Barro does not check for the role of outliers and
sample heterogeneity, while “It is well known in the statistics literature that the presence of a
few influential outliers can either hide a relationship, or create the appearance of one where
none exists . . .” (Temple 2000, p. 195). Third, Barro uses only the Gastil index as indicator
of democracy while there exist at least 4 alternatives, as will be explained later on. All these
variables are proxies for the latent variable “democracy” and may all suffer from measure-
ment errors. Using just one particular indicator is therefore not the proper way to examine
whether democracy matters. Unfortunately, this is what most studies on the relationship be-
tween political institutions and economic growth do. Finally, growth regressions are based
on very strong assumptions about a single linear model being appropriate for all countries at
all times, while very few countries have experienced consistently constant growth rates over
periods of several decades (Hausmann et al. 2005). The more typical pattern is that countries
experience phases of growth, stagnation, or decline of varying length. Even if a panel model
is used—as in Barro (1996)—instead of a cross-country model there is no guarantee that
differences in growth performances are picked up accurately. Most panel models use rather
arbitrary periods as unit of observation so that it is unlikely that they will identify variations
in growth rates over time.
I will discuss these shortcomings and outline the approach that I favor to deal with them.
3 Model specification
The model used by Barro (1996) is very arbitrary. Although Barro motivates the inclusion
of his control variables, some of them are at least suspect, while other potentially relevant
variables are not included. The basic problem here is that economic theory does not provide
enough guidance to select the proper specification of an empirical growth model. In other
words, growth theories are open-ended, i.e., the validity of one causal theory of growth
does not imply the falsity of another. Sala-i-Martin (1997) identifies, for instance, around 60
variables that have been suggested to be correlated with economic growth. Levine and Renelt
(1992) and Sala-i-Martin (1997) investigate the ‘robustness’ of regressions by checking how
sensitive the estimated coefficient of each variable of interest is to the inclusion of additional
explanatory variables. Although this so-called Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) has some
severe limitations, to which I will return later, I think that it is a fairly neutral means to check
robustness and compare the validity of conflicting findings in empirical research.7
The EBA, as first put forward by Leamer (1983), can be exemplified as follows. Equa-
tions of the following general form are estimated:
Y = αM + βF + γZ + u, (1)
6Unfortunately, and here is my first ‘footnote’, the incentives in our profession are such that many similar
models have since been published. Apparently, if a famous economist like Barro comes up with a model,
there is no need to think further.
7Various recent studies apply the EBA. For instance, Sturm et al. (2005) use the EBA to examine to what
extent variables are robust determinants of the likelihood that a country will receive IMF credit, while Baxter
and Kouparitsas (2005) use it to analyze which variables affect business cycle synchronization.
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where Y is the dependent variable; M is a vector of ‘standard’ explanatory variables; F is
the variable of interest; Z is a vector of possible additional explanatory variables, which
according to the literature may be related to the dependent variable; and u is an error term.
The extreme bounds test for variable F says that if the lower extreme bound for β− i.e.,
the lowest value for β minus two standard deviations—is negative, while the upper extreme
bound for β− i.e., the highest value for β plus two standard deviations—is positive, the
variable F is not robustly related to Y .
Sala-i-Martin (1997) rightly argues that the test applied in the extreme bounds analysis is
too strong for any variable to really pass it. If the distribution of the parameter of interest has
some positive and some negative support, then one is bound to find one regression for which
the estimated coefficient changes sign if enough regressions are run. Instead of analyzing
the extreme bounds of the estimates of the coefficient of a particular variable, Sala-i-Martin
(1997) suggests analyzing the entire distribution of the estimates of the parameter of interest.
Broadly speaking, if the averaged 90% confidence interval of a regression coefficient does
not include zero, Sala-i-Martin classifies the corresponding regressor as a variable that is
strongly correlated with economic growth.
The EBA has a couple of limitations:
– the selection of variables to be included in the M vector is not obvious and as a conse-
quence many of the models estimated may be misspecified;
– the number of variables in the M vector is arbitrarily often set at 3, following Levine and
Renelt (1992);
– various variables in the Z vector may be proxies for the same (latent) variable and may
cause multicollinearity problems.
Most of these concerns, however, can be addressed. As pointed out by Temple (2000), the
selection of variables for inclusion in the M vector can be decided upon following a general-
to-specific approach. In the BACE approach, which is yet another variant of the EBA as
recently put forward by Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004), the number of variables to be included
in the M vector is flexible.8 The final problem can be dealt with by using factor analysis;
I will come back to this when I address the measurement issue.
My conclusion is that authors should carefully check to what extent their results are
affected by the inclusion of variables, be it using some variant of the EBA, or some other
approach instead of relying on reporting their “favorite” regression. Unfortunately, even
today many papers do not contain a solid sensitivity analysis.9
8The Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) approach builds upon the approach as suggested by
Sala-i-Martin (1997) in the sense that different specifications are estimated (by OLS) to check the sensitivity
of the coefficient estimate of the variable of interest. The major innovation of BACE as compared to the Sala-
i-Martin’s approach is that there is no set of fixed variables included and the number of explanatory variables
in the specifications is flexible. The biggest disadvantages of the BACE approach are the need of having
a balanced dataset, i.e., an equal number of observations for all regressions (due to the chosen weighting
scheme), the restriction of limiting the list of potential variables to be less than the number of observations
and the computational burden.
9In my view editors of journals have a clear responsibility here as well, since the incentives in our profession
are wrong in this respect. Suppose, an author has come up with an ingenious theoretical model that (s)he can
test. If the outcome were that the empirical results would not support the model, the likelihood that this paper
will be accepted for publication is close to zero. Therefore, the author will torture the data long enough so
that (s)he can report at least some support for the model, preferably using a model that is akin to a model used
by a famous economist, like Robert Barro. As a consequence, the literature is flooded by papers that yield
conflicting conclusions.
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4 Outliers and sample heterogeneity10
Following Barnett and Lewis (1994, p. 316), we define an outlier as an observation ‘lying
outside’ the typical relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables revealed
by the remaining data. For instance, point A in Fig. 1(a) is clearly an outlier. Outliers in
the dependent variable—i.e., in the y-direction—often possess large positive or large nega-
tive residuals, which are easy to detect by plotting them. Observations may be outlying for
several reasons. The most obvious one involves problems with the quality of the data. Out-
liers in the explanatory variables may be more problematic than outliers in the dependent
variable. As Fig. 1(b) shows, an unusual observation in the x-direction (B) can actually tilt
the OLS regression line. In such a case we call the outlier a (bad) leverage point. Note that
looking at the OLS residuals cannot uncover bad leverage points. If a leverage point tilts the
regression line, deleting the points with the largest OLS residuals implies that some ‘good’
points would be deleted instead of the ‘bad’ leverage point.
Basically, there are two ways to deal with outliers: regression diagnostics and robust
estimation. Diagnostics are certain statistics mostly computed from the OLS regression es-
timates with the purpose of pinpointing outliers and leverage points. When there is only one
unusual observation, some of these methods work quite well. However, single-case diagnos-
tics are well known to be inadequate in the presence of multiple outliers or leverage points
(Temple 2000).
Take, for instance, Fig. 1c. Deleting either of the two outliers will have little effect on
the regression outcome and will therefore not be spotted by the single-case diagnostics. The
potential effect of one outlying observation is clearly masked by the presence of the other.
Testing for groups of observations to be influential might solve this masking effect problem
but is extremely cumbersome. Therefore I prefer so-called robust regression techniques that
employ estimators that are not strongly affected by (groups of) outliers.
Two closely related methods are the Least Median of Squares (LMS) and Least Trimmed
Squares (LTS) introduced by Rousseeuw (1984). LMS minimizes the median of the squared
residuals. LTS typically minimizes the sum of squares over half the observations, the chosen
half being the combination which gives the smallest residual sum of squares. According to
Temple (2000), LTS is generally thought preferable to LMS.
When we take a parameter heterogeneity perspective, it is clear that we can think about
outliers in another way (Temple 2000). Some observations may be entirely correct, but
drawn from a different regime. In most research, it is implicitly assumed that only one
Fig. 1 Outlying observations and bad leverage points. The solid lines represent the OLS estimates including
the unusual observation(s). The dotted lines represent the OLS estimates without the unusual observations A,
B , or C. The dashed line represents the OLS estimate without observations C and D
10This part heavily draws on Sturm and De Haan (2005).
286 Public Choice (2007) 131: 281–292
Fig. 2 Hypothetical example. Hypothetical dataset for series x and y of 50 observations. The first 30 ob-
servations have the following characteristics: series x is uniformly distributed between 0.5 and 4.5. Series y
is distributed around the line y = 2 + x + e, where e is normally distributed with mean zero and standard
deviation 0.2. The remaining 20 observations follow a Normal distribution: x ∼ N(6,0.5) and y ∼ N(2,0.5).
The solid line represents the LTS estimate, whereas the dotted line represents the OLS estimate
regime generates the data, or that the parameters in the different regimes vary randomly.
However, both assumptions may not be correct (see, e.g., Durlauf and Johnson 1995). Ro-
bust estimators can be thought of as trying to seek out the most coherent part of the data, the
part best approximated by the model being estimated.
We can illustrate this by the following example taken from Sturm and De Haan (2005).
Figure 2 shows a dataset for two variables (x and y) in which 40% of the (50) observations
follow a different distribution than the rest of the observations. Assume a researcher would
not know this and would simply estimate a linear relationship between x and y. As the OLS
model assumes all observations are drawn from one single distribution, the OLS regression
line estimated by this researcher as shown in Fig. 2 will not reveal any valuable information.
In contrast, the LTS regression line looks for a linear relationship, which fits the majority
of the data. As 60% of the dataset follows a linear relationship, LTS will reveal that rela-
tionship. The remaining 40% of the observation will have large negative residuals which are
easily depicted by graphing the standardized residuals. As this example shows, that does not
mean that those observations should be ignored and simply thrown away. Those observa-
tions reveal that the linear model is not adequate for the entire dataset as not all observations
follow the same regime.
5 Testing for the robust impact of democracy using robust estimators
According to Temple (2000, p. 195), “any good approach to model uncertainty should
ideally be robust to observations that are measured with error, or drawn from a different
regime . . . I propose using a simple variant of EBA in which each regression is first es-
timated by robust methods”. This is exactly what Jan-Egbert Sturm and I have done in a
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Table 1 Democracy and economic growth, Extreme Bounds Analysis: OLS and LTS/RLS (using Gastil’s
civil liberty index)













Civil liberty −0.0089 0.0039 33.50 −0.0025 0.0014 0.93
LTS/RLS outcomes
Civil liberty −0.0137 0.0060 73.99 −0.0031∗∗ 0.0013 0.95
Note: Each row is based on 10,700 regressions. ∗ and ∗∗ indicate significance at the 5 and 1 percent level,
respectively
recent paper (Sturm and De Haan 2005). In work in progress, we also apply this method to
examine the impact of democracy on economic growth.
Table 1 shows the outcomes of two EBAs: one estimated with OLS, the other one es-
timated by LTS/RLS.11 In the first model, the coefficient of the civil liberty indicator (the
proxy for democracy in this example) is not significantly different from zero, while in the
other it is. I do not want to draw any firm conclusions from these regressions, but they il-
lustrate that employing robust estimators may make a difference. The reason that I do not
want to draw firm conclusions from this model has to with measurement issues, which is the
third problem on my list of shortcomings of existing research on the relationship between
political institutions and economic growth.
6 Measurement issues
Most studies—like Barro (1996) and, indeed, the model just shown—employ just one in-
dicator for democracy and do not test whether conclusions are sensitive to the use of other
indicators that have been suggested in the literature. There are various alternative indicators
for the political system:
• The Gastil data and dummy variables based on it to take into account that the Gastil data
are not cardinal variables. Gastil has created two measures of liberty: political liberty and
civil liberty. Political (civil) rights are ranked from 1 (the highest degree of liberty) to 7
(the lowest). The political rights rankings are based on the degree to which individuals
in a state have control over those who govern. The civil liberties rankings purport to
measure the rights of the individual (e.g., independence of the judiciary, freedom of the
press, freedom of assembly and demonstration, freedom of political organization, free
trade unions, free religious institutions).
11The dependent variable is the average growth of per capita GDP. In the M vector the following variables
are included: average equipment investment as share of GDP; the secondary school enrolment rate in 1960;
and average population growth. We use the dataset of Sala-i-Martin (1997) that refers to 1960–92. A country
has been included if we have observations for more than half of these years.
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• The Polity IV indicators (Marshall and Jaggers 2004). The Polity Democracy Index
ranges from 0 to 10 and is derived from coding the competitiveness of political partic-
ipation, the openness and competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the
chief executive. The Polity Autocracy Index also ranges from 0 to 10 and is constructed
in a similar way to the democracy score based on scoring countries according to com-
petitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness and
competitiveness of executive recruitment and constraints on the chief executive.
• Gasiorowski’s (1993) dataset that measures how long a country has been a democracy or
autocracy.12
• The democracy indicator developed by Vanhanen (2000), which is based on participation
and competition. The first is measured by the smaller parties’ share of the votes cast in
parliamentary or presidential elections, or both. The second is measured by the percentage
of the total population who actually voted in the election concerned.
• The dataset of Przeworski et al. (2000) in which they classify country-years on the basis
of some electoral rules (chief executive must be elected, legislature must be elected, there
must be more than one party).
All of these indicators are proxies for the latent variable “democracy” and they may all suffer
from measurement errors. Their correlation is sometimes strikingly low.13 The use of latent
variable techniques, like factor analysis, is in my view called for under these circumstances.
Let me elaborate on this, using my second example, i.e., research on political instability
and economic growth.14 Since political instability in a country cannot be measured directly,
empirical studies often rely on indicators like the number of coups d’état (Londregan and
Poole 1990) or the number of political revolutions (Barro 1991). While these indicators
probably capture some aspects of political instability, they are certainly not perfect. Some
authors acknowledge the problem of measurement error and combine various indicators in a
single index, while others predict the propensity of government change using binary choice
models in which the occurrence of government transfers is related to various economic,
political and institutional variables (e.g., Cukierman et al. 1992). These approaches have in
common that the used indicators are assumed to be highly correlated with political instability
and that political instability is a one-dimensional concept. The first assumption is generally
validated on theoretical grounds, but it is never thoroughly tested, while the second one has
been disputed (see, for instance, Hibbs 1973).
Jong-A-Pin (2006) has applied factor analysis to 26 political instability indicators, which
have all been used in some previous study and which are available for 128 countries for the
12This variable focuses on the duration of a regime, which is, according to Clague et al. (1996), more relevant
than the nature of the regime as such. These authors argue that the quality of economic policies and institutions
depends partly on the incentives and constraints faced by policymakers, which vary from one autocracy to
another and from one democracy to another. Clague et al. (1996) hypothesize that in autocracies it is the
time horizon of the individual autocrat that is the main determinant of property and contract rights, whereas
in democracies these rights depend upon whether the democratic system is durable. In a very similar way,
Wintrobe (1998) distinguishes between two sorts of authoritarian regimes: totalitarians and tinpots. Whereas
totalitarians derive utility from power as such and try to maximize it, tinpots choose the level of power that
secures their remaining in office.
13Glaeser et al. (2004) discuss the measurement of some proxies for political institutions that have been used
in recent research, asking if these measures of institutions reflect a) constraints on government and b) perma-
nent or at least durable features of the environment. They argue that, in fact, these proxies—including one
of the Polity IV indicators—reflect neither as they all measure outcomes, not some permanent characteristics
that North refers to.
14The following part heavily draws on Jong-A-Pin (2006).
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Within instability 0.01 −0.06 1.00
Regime instability 0.37 0.40 −0.13 1.00
Source: Jong-A-Pin (2006)
period 1984–2003. The aim of the factor analysis model is to separate the information that
is common to all indicators from the information that is unique to a single indicator. By as-
suming that the observed indicators are “generated” by a linear combination of unobserved
factors and some individual error term, a simple model structure is imposed on the covari-
ance matrix of the indicators. When a convenient and parsimonious model is specified, the
factor analysis can be used to obtain unbiased predictions of the values of the unobserved
latent variables. An additional advantage, which may especially be relevant in the context of
the EBA, is that it reduces problems of multicollinearity.
Jong-A-Pin identifies four dimensions of political instability: (1) civil protest, (2) polit-
ically motivated violence, (3) instability within the political regime, and (4) instability of
the political regime. Indicators that are associated with collective protest by the population
are clearly the only variables that have high loadings for the first factor. The second factor
has high loadings for the indicators associated with political violence and warfare, while the
third factor corresponds to indicators reflecting changes within the political system, such as
the changes in the chief executive and replacements of veto players in the political process.
The indicators with high loadings on the fourth factor are the number of major constitutional
changes, the number of coups d’état and the number of regime changes. As Table 2 shows,
these dimensions are not highly correlated. So using just one indicator or one dimension is
unlikely to fully capture the latent variable ‘political instability’.
Jong-A-Pin (2006) also finds that the various dimensions of political instability that he
has identified are differently correlated with economic growth. Using an augmented version
of the model of Mankiw et al. (1992), he reports that the different dimensions of political
instability do not have the same relationship with economic growth.
7 How to use the time dimension?
A single time trend does not adequately characterize the evolution of GDP per capita in
many countries. In my view, the traditional cross-country and panel growth models are not
well suited to use information provided by the time dimension. If panels are used, the time
span should be at least 10 years; otherwise the model will not be able to distinguish properly
between long-term growth and business cycles.15 Unfortunately, the periods chosen in panel
models are often justified only on the grounds that data were available at those frequencies
15Pritchett (2000) identifies four problems concerning the use of higher-frequency data in growth models,
particularly with techniques that remove country-specific effects: lower power, greater measurement error,
endogenicity, and dynamic misspecification.
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or the researcher wanted to divide the whole period into equal chunks. These periods are
unlikely to identify information provided by the development of variables over time. If,
for instance, there is a high growth rate in the first five years and a low growth rate in the
second half of the ten-year period, the period average will be rather uninformative. In recent
research some alternatives have been suggested that, in my view, have the potential for using
the information provided by the time dimension in a more promising way. Let me give you
three examples.
Due to the fixation on long-run differences in growth, empirical growth research has
underestimated the importance of instability and volatility in growth rates, especially in de-
veloping countries. Pritchett (2000) was one of the first studies to identify that instability
in growth rates over time for a single country is great, relative to both the average level
of growth and the variance across countries. Many countries have a break in their economic
development. These shifts in growth rates lead to distinct growth patterns. While some coun-
tries have steady growth, others have rapid growth followed by stagnation, rapid growth fol-
lowed by decline, continuous stagnation, or steady decline. Pritchett identifies the following
patterns:
• Steep hills, i.e., countries that had growth rates higher than 3% in both periods.
• Hills, i.e., countries with growth rates higher than 1.5% in each period.
• Plateaus, i.e., countries that grew more than 1.5% before their structural break, but after-
ward growth fell to less than 1.5%, although it remained positive.
• Mountains, i.e., countries that had growth rates higher than 1.5% before their trend break,
but negative rates afterward.16
• Plains, i.e., countries with growth rates less than 1.5% both before and after their struc-
tural break.17
• Accelerators, i.e., countries that did not have growth rates above 1.5% before their struc-
tural break, but did afterward.
I suggest using these country-specific patterns (or others) as units of observation in panel
growth models instead of decade averages. This implies that the explanatory variables have
to be constructed accordingly. This is a time-intensive approach, but worth the effort.
My second example is the study by Hausmann et al. (2005), who focus on turning points
in growth performance, examining instances of rapid acceleration in economic growth. They
identify more than 80 such episodes since the 1950s. They define a growth acceleration as an
increase in per-capita growth of 2 percentage points or more. To qualify as an acceleration,
the increase in growth has to be sustained for at least eight years and the post-acceleration
growth rate has to be at least 3.5% per year. In addition, to rule out cases of pure recov-
ery, they require that post-acceleration output exceed the pre-episode peak level of income.
Countries can have more than one instance of growth acceleration as long as the dates are
more than 5 years apart. Interestingly, these authors claim that the largest number of growth
accelerations is actually in Africa, a continent that one hardly associates with economic
growth. They also find that political-regime changes are statistically significant predictors
of growth accelerations. A political regime change increases the probability of a growth ac-
celeration by 5.3 percentage points. It is worthwhile to examine how robust the results of
Hausmann et al. (2005) are.
16The mountains include some countries with cliffs, very sharp drops, usually resulting from war or civil
unrest.
17Included among the plains countries are those with consistently negative growth rates that could be char-
acterized as valleys.
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My final example of how the time dimension can be taken into account is the study by
Jones and Olken (2005), who examine whether national leaders, who change sharply and
at potentially high frequency, have a causative effect on growth. As leadership transitions
may be driven by underlying economic conditions, these authors focus on cases where the
leader’s rule ended at death due to either natural causes or an accident. They find evidence
that leaders matter, notably in autocratic regimes. Their method is quite simple. First, they
estimate the following regression:
gi,t = αzPREz + βzPOSTz + vi + vt + εi,t , (1)
where gi,t is the annual growth rate of real purchasing-power-parity GDP per capita, i in-
dexes countries, t indexes time in years, and z indexes leader deaths. Country and time fixed
effects are included through vi and vt , respectively. For each leader death, there is a separate
set of dummies, denoted PREz and POSTz. PREz is a dummy equal to 1 in the T years
prior to leader z’s death in that leader’s country, while POSTz is a dummy equal to 1 in the
T years after leader z’s death in that leader’s country. Jones and Olken estimate separate co-
efficients, αz and βz, for each leader death z. The model is estimated using all countries and
all years of data, as countries without leader deaths can be used to help estimate time fixed
effects. Jones and Olken employ parametric and non-parametric tests to examine whether
there is any effect of leadership change on growth. This method can easily be applied to
changes in political institutions, even though there is a problem of potential endogenicity.
For instance, if there is a clear change in the political system, this method allows one to test
whether economic growth differs before and after this change.
8 Conclusion
I have discussed research on the relationship between institutions and economic develop-
ment, focusing on two illustrations, i.e., the impact of democracy and political instability on
economic growth. Various pitfalls of existing research are identified, like sensitivity of the
outcomes to model specification, sample heterogeneity, measurement of political variables,
and the treatment of the time dimension. I have outlined some elements of what I consider
to be a more promising approach of analyzing the relationship between political institutions
and economic growth. I think that it will give us reliable answers to some questions that
have been on our research agenda for so long.
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